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On August 7, 2002, Brazil received a $30 billion dollar package that was the larg-
est loan granted in International Monetary Fund (IMF) history and brought total IMF
lending to the country to $63 billion since 1998. The bailout was simply the latest
chapter in a recent saga of unprecedented financial instability and crisis affecting
virtually every region of the global economy mercilessly. Since 1997 there have also
been major crises in Argentina, Ecuador, Thailand, Russia, Uruguay, Columbia, Indo-
nesia, Kenya, and Korea. This instability has been associated with rapid financial
liberalization without exception. For example, in Korea, the crisis of November 1997
followed the deregulation of interest rates, the opening of the capital market, foreign
exchange liberalization, the granting of new banking licenses, and the dismantling of
government monitoring mechanisms that were part of the policy loan system.
The post-1997 pattern of liberalization leading to crisis is a continuation of earlier
trends that have become ubiquitous in Latin America and elsewhere. In 1989, Ven-
ezuela implemented financial liberalization as part of a standard orthodox IMF and
World Bank adjustment package and sectoral loan. Policies related to finance included
the removal of quotas for priority lending, the liberalization of interest rates, the
opening up of the banking sector to foreign ownership, and the privatization of com-
mercial banks. By 1994, the banking system was in a full-fledged meltdown. Between
January 1994 and August 1995, 17 financial institutions failed, encompassing 60 per-
cent of the total assets of the financial system and 50 percent of the deposits and an246 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
estimated 20 percent of the GDP to clean up [Vera 2002]. In Mexico, liberalization and
privatization in the early 1990s has proven also to be enormously costly. By 1999, the
cost of the government intervention reached $65 billion or roughly 17 percent of the
1998 GDP [Financial Times 1999]. Other countries in different regions, including the
Caribbean and Africa, have followed orthodox courses of financial liberalization, with
very similar results (see, for example, Stein, Ajakaiye, and Lewis [2002] and Stein,
Cuesta, and McLennon [2002], for a number of individual cases in these regions).
These examples are not isolated exceptions but more the rule. Demirguc-Kunt
and Detragiache [1999] survey banking crises in 53 countries covering the period
between 1980 and 1995 and find that 78 percent of all crises were linked to periods of
financial liberalization (see also World Bank [2001, 83] Table 2.1 for a comprehensive
list of the costs involved in these and other crises, amounting to 50 percent of GDP in
some cases). Given the ubiquity of these crises, why do governments pursue financial
liberalization? Answers to this question include the institutionalization in recent decades
of norms of “acceptable” financial policies, the perceived potential gains of attracting
private capital inflows, the nature of global systems and the asymmetric power rela-
tions embedded in global structures that delimit nation-state options, and, finally, the
expected gains arising from the economic logic embedded in the theory underlying
financial liberalization.
This paper will focus on the latter question, arguing that financial liberalization
policy is built on shaky theoretical premises. We suggest that the recent financial
crises that have hit so many developing countries and transitional economies are
induced not merely by the inappropriate sequencing, pacing, or timing of internal and
external financial liberalization, but they are the inevitable outcome of adopting the
policy that is based on a very shallow understanding of the dynamic relationships
between finance and economic development. In our view, financial transformation in
the image of McKinnon-Shaw has engendered widespread banking crises precisely
because of the weak foundations of the theory. Our view is that bad theory gives rise
to policies that give rise to crises. In contrast, the proponents of the financial liberal-
ization thesis see financial crises as somehow irrelevant to their theory and the policy
that it has inspired. This is paradoxical in that proponents argue, when crises take
place, that more of their policy prescriptions should be the cure, when it is precisely
those policies that caused the crises in the first instance. Polanyi [1957] describes this
paradox very well when he argues that the apologists, the defenders of financial mar-
ket liberalization, “are repeating in endless variations that but for the policies advo-
cated by its critics, liberalism would have delivered the goods; that not the competi-
tive system and the self-regulating market, but interference with that system and
interventions with that market are responsible for our ills” (p. 143). Hence, the paper
aims at sketching an alternative theoretical perspective by examining institutional
requirements for building and transforming financial systems for economic develop-
ment. The focus is how to enhance the operational and developmental role of banks
and other financial entities within the broader financial system. The aim is to trans-
form the meso-level, which mediates micro and macro financial relations in an economy.
We are not looking specifically at the micro level, but at factors that affect the micro
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The paper is structured as follows: We first give a brief presentation of main
theses in financial liberalization theory (section 2). This is followed by a critique from
both theoretical (sections 3 and 4) and empirical (section 5) points of view. Section 6
offers an alternative perspective on financial transformation more consistent with
economic development (that is, consistent with both an institutionalist theory of eco-
nomic development and with the reality of the institutional structure of developing
economies) that draws on a rather different set of theoretical tools and ideas. Finally,
section 7 summarizes and concludes.
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION THEORY: RETURNING TO THE ORIGINAL
TEXTS
Financial liberalization theory has its origins in the work of McKinnon [1973] and
Shaw [1973]. It was Patrick [1966], however, who published the seminal work on the
relationship between financial development and economic growth. He hypothesized
two possible relationships, a “demand-following” approach, in which financial develop-
ment arises as the economy develops, and a “supply-leading” phenomenon, in which
the widespread expansion of financial institutions leads to economic growth. Prior to
Patrick [1966] there had been a great deal of debate on the issue, with contributors
ranging from Bagehot [1873] and Schumpeter [1912], who supported the supply-leading
view, to Robinson [1952], who voiced strong support for the demand-following approach,
to mention only the main protagonists. The financial liberalization school leans towards
the supply-leading relationship between growth and development [McKinnon, 1973].
The argument arises out of a highly simplified world without financial intermediaries,
whereby the purchase of capital can only arise from self-finance; for when an indi-
vidual who is limited to self-finance wishes to “purchase physical capital of a type that
is different from his own output…He may store inventories of his own output for
eventual sale when the capital assets are acquired or he may steadily accumulate cash
balances for the same purpose” McKinnon, 1973, 57].
In their view, prior savings are seen to help the accumulation process. Conse-
quently, according to this view, the key is to alter the incentives between consump-
tion and saving. Following classical economics, interest rates are seen as providing
the return for this choice.1 When interest rates are kept artificially low, the result will
be shallow financing. For example, Shaw [1973, 8] argues: “Deepening implies that
interest rates must report more accurately the opportunities that exist for substitu-
tion of investment for current consumption and the disinclination of consumers to
wait. Real rates of interest are high where finance is deepening.” Unlike Keynes
[1936], in which interest rates affect the demand for and supply of money, Shaw [1973]
follows the classical model, in which the equilibrium between savings and investment
is determined by interest rates. A rise in real interest rates increases the flow of
savings and reduces the excess demand. Rates of return on holding money also play a
role in increasing investment levels [McKinnon, 1973].
In this paradigm, the desire to hold money is also positively affected by the rate of
return on capital, contrary to the portfolio approach (which has a negative relation-
ship). With higher investment, there will also be a related improvement in the quality248 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
of investment and a rise in the savings levels allocated through the market. Rationing
of credit reduces the quality of intermediation, however, with negative consequences
to investment: “Rationing is expensive to administer. It is vulnerable to corruption
and conspiracy in dividing between borrowers and officers of the intermediary monopoly
rent that arises from the difference between low, regulated loan rate and the market-
clearing rate. Borrowers who simply do not repay loans and keep their place in the
ration queue by extending maturities can frustrate it. The rationing process discrimi-
nates poorly among investment opportunities...and the social cost of this misalloca-
tion is suggested by the high incremental ratios of investment to output that lagging
economies report” [Shaw, 1973, 86].
It is further argued that competition through private ownership can shrink the
difference between deposit and loan rates, encouraging “optimal” agreements between
banks, and among borrowers and lenders, in turn increasing the efficiency of interme-
diation. Moreover, “fragmentation” in developing countries: “…in the sense that firms
and households face…different effective prices for land, labor, capital and produced
commodities…has been largely the result of government policy” [McKinnon, 1973, 5-7].
Reversing fragmentation by creating a single capital market through the retraction of
state intervention is then regarded as the sine qua non of economic development:
“Arbitrary measures to introduce modern technology via tariffs, or to increase the
rate of capital accumulation by relying on foreign aid or domestic forced saving, will
not necessarily lead to economic development. Thus it is hypothesized that unification
of the capital market, which sharply increases rates of return to domestic savers by
widening exploitable investment opportunities, is essential for eliminating other forms
of fragmentation” [McKinnon, 1973, 9].2 By implication, McKinnon [1973] and Shaw
[1973] support the liberalization of the capital account in order to provide a unified
capital market for private decision makers to undertake utility-maximizing
intertemporal choice.3
A THEORETICAL COMMENT ON THE FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
HYPOTHESIS
There are several fundamental problems with the financial liberalization hypoth-
esis. To begin with, the argument is developed in an almost Robinson Crusoe frame-
work, in which all investment is self-financing. This is abstracted from the complexi-
ties of money as a social institution. In reality, money is by nature socially embedded.
The holding of money even in the simple rural setting discussed by McKinnon [1973],
is subject to social obligations and constraints, and not simply driven by investment
needs, the productivity of capital, and real return on holding money. Moreover, the
presentation is contradictory. It is just not possible to talk about self-financing as if no
other financial options exist, and discuss a return to holding money as some “weighted
average of nominal interest rates of all forms of deposits” [McKinnon, 1973, 39], which
presupposes the existence of a sophisticated financial system.
McKinnon [1973] is, of course, determined to show a positive relationship among
higher interest rates, financial development, and investment and growth. He is criti-
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and assets, since it posits a negative relationship between the demand for real bal-
ances and the return on nonfinancial assets. He really is not escaping from a portfolio
approach, however; he simply redefines it as a choice between a noninterest-bearing
asset (own stocks of products) and money (which is interest bearing). By introducing a
lagged time dimension into the choice between money balances and nonmonetary
assets, holding the portfolio as a store of value becomes the focal point in his analysis.
The total of this portfolio is related to the desired rate of future capital investment.
The higher the expected rate of return, the greater the desire to hold money balances.
McKinnon [1973] would argue that, in properly operating capital markets without
fragmentation, all that is necessary is a single unifying marginal rate of return.
Economy-wide choices then simply operate like individual choices. The problem with
this perception is that capital markets have never operated in this manner. Markets
are always fragmented and replete with different levels of risk and uncertainty even
in the most advanced economies. Perceptions of rates of return vary not only with
different types of financial vehicles but also by individuals. An individual on a particu-
lar project perceives interest rates paid by governments very differently from the
anticipated future return. Nothing will automatically unify them into a single concat-
enating vision of a future payout.
The theory of financial liberalization also relies on the assumption of the competi-
tive model. The divergence between the financial world and the competitive model is
profound, however. Finance is replete with asymmetries of risk and information that
are less evident in goods markets. Stiglitz [1989, 1994] points to a host of market
imperfections embedded in financial markets that go beyond the well-known issues of
moral hazard and adverse selection. They include: 1) the large divergence between
the social and private costs of bank failures; 2) the public good nature of the solvency
of institutions that are likely to be undersupplied; 3) the externality effect of the
presence of a few bad banks on the confidence of the sector; and 4) the divergence
between the private (those with rapid turnover) and social (projects are likely to have
longer turnover periods and higher risk) benefits of loans. Furthermore, and contrary
to the standard assumption of markets, financial markets will not be Pareto efficient
(where the price represents the marginal benefit to the buyer and the marginal cost to
the supplier), since the borrower (buyer) willing to pay the most for a loan, may not
provide the highest profit to the lender (seller). An important recent contribution by
the imperfect information school goes to the heart of financial liberalization thesis,
that is, the enhanced degree of competition it creates [Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz,
2000]. More competition, according to this contribution, erodes franchise value, which
reduces incentives for prudential behavior, thereby substantially increasing risk in
the system. The problem of finance in developing countries is much deeper and more
multifaceted, however, than suggested by the imperfect information school, as argued
below.
The focal point of financial liberalization is on retracting the sources of repression
that have distorted the signaling effect of interest rates. Either the signals themselves
are disrupted by the “fragmentation” created by government policy or the signals are
misread due to the state ownership pattern of financial organizations. On the latter
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political or patronage influences, while private owners will react to the signals with
Pareto efficient decisions on the allocation of credit. Stiglitz [1989, 1994], and the
imperfect information school, recognize that financial markets left to their own devices
are generally incapable of providing correct signals. State intervention should be aimed
at creating moderate forms of financial repression to alter the signals that lead to
more socially optimal outcomes. The problem is that, given the poorly developed nature
of financial markets in developing countries, even adjusted signaling may not have
the desired results and may even lead to unintended consequences. In countries like
Nigeria—where regulation is poor, norms of trust are not developed, and a military
government hands out banking licenses to military officials—subsidizing interest rates
would have done little to reverse the financial chaos created by liberalization after
1986. While interest rates are important, they are only one dimension of the incen-
tives and disincentives that influence the decision-making process in financial systems.
The McKinnon-Shaw world of finance is one where financial intermediaries via
markets for depositing and lending simply set interest rates to balance the supply and
demand for savings of borrowers and depositors. In this world, there are three actors
in two exchanges with the difference in the price of the two exchanges simply reflect-
ing the cost of intermediation (which will be kept low with sufficient competition). One
only needs the unfettered operation of self-seeking atomistic individuals to arrive at
Pareto optimality. There is no need for institutions. However, in the real world, inter-
est rates and incentives are only one dimension of finance, which is a complex institu-
tion embedded in a broader system of nonfinancial institutions. As we will see below,
many of the econometric studies have difficulty pinpointing clear causality between
finance and development. We would argue this is precisely because of the intertwin-
ing and interaction between the development of financial institutions and the finance
of developing institutions. These issues will be explored below.
Financial transformation in the image of McKinnon-Shaw has engendered wide-
spread banking crises precisely because of the weak foundations of the theory. How-
ever, McKinnon [1993] has argued that it is not a problem with the theory or the
policies arising from the theory, but one of sequencing, particularly when deregula-
tion is introduced before macroeconomic stabilization is completed. We turn our atten-
tion next to this issue.
SEQUENCING, MACROSTABILITY, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
McKinnon [1993] attempted to account for institutional capabilities and weak-
nesses under “the optimum order of economic liberalisation.” He argues that “How
fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange policies are sequenced is of critical importance.
Government cannot, and perhaps should not, undertake all liberalizing measures si-
multaneously. Instead, there is an ‘optimal’ order of economic liberalisation, which
may vary for different liberalizing economies depending on their initial conditions”
[McKinnon, 1993, 4]. This optimal order would begin with the control of inflation, lead-
ing to the deregulation of interest rates, banking privatization and commercialization,
foreign exchange rate unification, trade liberalization, and only then opening up the
capital account. Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson [1994] review financial reforms in a num-
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some depth and length. They conclude that managing the reform process rather than
adopting a laissez-faire stance is important, and that sequencing along with the initial
conditions in finance and macroeconomic stability are critical elements in implement-
ing successfully financial reforms. It is thus recommended now that gradual financial
liberalization is to be preferred. In this gradual process, a “sequencing of financial
liberalization” is recommended, emphasizing the achievement of stability in the broader
macroeconomic environment and adequate bank supervision within which financial
reforms are to be undertaken [Cho and Khatkhate, 1989a; McKinnon, 1988; Sachs,
1988; Villanueva and Mirakhor, 1990]. Employing credibility arguments, Calvo [1988]
and Rodrik [1987] suggest a narrow focus of reforms with financial liberalization left
as last.
The argument embedded in the order of financial liberalization has increasingly
been challenged. A more recent literature has indicated that financial liberalization in
any sequence has engendered the same difficulties. Even where the “correct” sequencing
took place (for example, Chile), where trade liberalization had taken place before
financial liberalization, not much success can be reported. It is also true in those
cases, like Uruguay, where the “reverse” sequencing took place—financial liberaliza-
tion before trade liberalization—that the experience was very much the same as in
Chile. The experience with financial liberalization, in both developed and developing
countries, in the 1980s and 1990s suggests a marked increase in the frequency and
severity of financial crises irrespective of the order of sequencing [Lindgreen, Garcia,
and Saal, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Grabel, 1995; Arestis and
Demetriades, 1997].
Moreover, the study by Weller [2001] surveys 26 countries representing every
region of the world to evaluate the relationship between financial liberalization and
crisis. Among the sample are many variations in the sequencing of policies. Drawing
on the work of Minsky [1984], a number of hypotheses about the relationship between
financial liberalization and the banking crises that typically follow are tested. Internal
and external deregulation fosters financial fragility by encouraging flows to specula-
tive ventures. Asset inflation can raise the collateral of borrowers and increase the
euphoria. Speculation becomes self-fulfilling as greater flows into speculation in turn
perpetuate the speculative boom. Short-term capital inflows after liberalization can
raise the exchange rates leading to deterioration in the current account, with implica-
tions to real growth in sectors like industry. This is exacerbated by the shift away
from investment finance to speculation. Eventually, asset prices begin to deflate, default
risk rises, and maturity risk increases as short-term outflows increase in response to
the worsening balance sheet of banks. Ultimately, the economy is marked by a rise in
interest rates, credit contraction, import price inflation, and depleted domestic demand.
Weller’s [2001] results confirm these hypotheses, especially that of the growth of
financial fragility after financial liberalization. Indeed, more speculative financing
greatly enhances the chances of a banking crisis after financial liberalization. Of par-
ticular interest is how long financial liberalization will continue to increase the chances
of future financial crises. It has been frequently argued that financial liberalization
might lead to short-term dislocation but it will be beneficial in the long term. The
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but it in fact increases over time. The study by Arestis and Glickman [2002] reaches
similar conclusions in the case of the South East Asian crisis, supporting these hypotheses.
Other studies have also confirmed the lack of significance of “sequencing.” Arestis,
Demetriades, and Fattouh [2003] survey the literature and offer their own empirical
investigation, and find no evidence that varying the sequence of financial liberaliza-
tion along McKinnon’s [1993] optimal lines leads to any different results. In line with
Weller’s [2001] findings, there is strong evidence of increasing frequency and severity
of financial crises in the wake of liberalization. A World Bank econometric study of the
relationship between banking crises and a series of explanatory factors [Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1999], found them to be highly correlated with financial liber-
alization policies even when controlling for factors like the sequencing recommended
by McKinnon [1993]. Other problems with “sequencing” include the question of its
timing, that is, how do policy makers know when it is time to move from one stage to
the next? Sequencing, of course, can easily create inertia in reform, if indeed reform
is necessary.
The notion of the existence of some optimal sequence can be questioned for other
reasons. Any evaluation of financial liberalization should not be merely based on eco-
nomic criteria, but should also contain elements from the realm of politics (Armijo,
1999). There is also the rather flawed belief that orthodox financial liberalization will
lead to an improvement that is growth enhancing. Underhill [1997], in contrast, is far
less sanguine concerning the prospect of economic gains from following some optimal
sequence of financial transformation. By nature, any change in existing financial arrange-
ments creates new winners and losers with implications to the political realm. He
characterizes the new changes in a financial system as constituting desegmentation
(unifying various branches of finance into a single branch), marketization (domestic
financial market liberalization) and transnationalization (integrating financial mar-
kets across national boundaries). The actual outcome of change varies in accordance
with the relative strength of the constituent members of the financial community
(government players, including central bankers and regulators, national and multina-
tional banks, pressures from international financial institutions, strength of private
involvement in privatization, etc.). The final outcome is unpredictable with no guar-
antee of any economic improvements and involves considerable downside risk follow-
ing any sequence.
Examples of Underhill’s [1997] observation abound. In Nigeria, under the military
rule of Babingida, applications for all new banking licenses were reviewed by the
President’s office and Federal Executive Council controlled by the military. Retired
military officials with no banking experience were instrumental in obtaining banking
licenses without the proper procedures being followed. Central bank officials who
were interviewed indicated the near impossibility of turning down applications in the
climate of military control. It is hard to conceive of any sequence of reform working in
this climate or changing the results of the now well-documented banking crisis that
followed. In addition, politics played a major role in the attempt to reorganize the
financial system after the banking crisis. In Nigeria, after 1996, General Abacha used
the opportunity to punish political opponents and challenge the independence of some
business groups [Lewis and Stein, 2002].253 ALTERNATIVES TO FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION THEORY
Finally, some have suggested that McKinnon [1993] was implicitly arguing for
greater prudence and gradualism in financial reform. Based on our above arguments,
however, it is our contention that the problem is neither time alone nor sequence, but
linked to a fundamental misconceptualization of the underlying theory behind the
financial liberalization thesis, irrespective of the order.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
HYPOTHESIS
The importance of examining the broader conditions before transforming finan-
cial systems goes beyond the framework of political economy to the underlying struc-
tures of any developing economy. While there is broad agreement on the complica-
tions of undertaking liberalization in the midst of macro instability, where economies
are structurally weak, subject to the vicissitudes of international commodity prices
and shifting financial flows with few stabilizing reserves, instability is likely to be the
rule rather than the exception. Even when bankers are completely honest and regula-
tory systems are in place, macro instability or the likelihood of a future occurrence
will encourage bankers to hold reserves in government paper and to limit loans to
short-term duration. In places like Venezuela, Nigeria, and Russia, financial liberal-
ization led to a decrease in the duration of loans and increase in the holding of govern-
ment paper [Stein, Ajakaiye, and Lewis, 2002]. In Tanzania, although most of the
banking system is now in foreign private hands and inflation has fallen below 5 per-
cent, banks are sitting on 60 percent excess reserves with much of it being held in
government paper [The African, 2002].
Given the central role of the financial liberalization hypothesis in liberalization
programs and the evolving literature, there has been a proliferation of econometric
testing of the theory and attendant policy correctives. In general, despite continuing
efforts to discern the postulated positive relationship between financial liberalization
and growth by mainstream economists through cross-country studies,4 support for the
financial liberalization hypothesis is not very strong and there is growing evidence
confirming Keynes’ [1936] view of the linkage among interest rates, investment, and
savings.
We begin with the literature that tests the finance-to-development causation or
supply-leading relationship. Habibullah [1999] surveys the literature for the financial-
led growth hypothesis and undertakes his own testing, finding little evidence to sup-
port this hypothesis.5 Akinboade [1998] also uses Granger causality testing in a
cointegration framework on Botswana data covering the period 1972 to 1995, to find
clear bi-directional causality. Similarly, Sahoo, Geethanjali, and Kamaiah [2001] note
that in the case of India in the 1970s high levels of savings did not lead to higher levels
of growth. Later periods of growth seemed to occur without an appreciable rise in
savings. To examine this more systematically, they apply causality testing of real
savings and real GDP data from 1950/51 to 1998/99. They manage to establish a strong
one-way linkage from growth to savings and thereby refute the proposition that sav-
ings was the engine of growth in the case of India.254 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The growth-to-savings causality has also been confirmed by some World Bank’s
studies. Countries in Asia were very successful in mobilizing savings, yet strong evi-
dence indicates that investment and growth led to savings rather than savings to
growth. It was not savings that led to the phenomenal investment and growth rates of
recent decades, but the rise of income that increased savings. The World Bank [1993]
found the causation from growth to savings in five countries (Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Thailand, and Taiwan) and ambiguity in two (Hong Kong and Malaysia); in one it was
due to other factors (in Singapore, the state provident fund was salient).
Surveys of the literature indicate little or no evidence of a positive relationship
between interest rates and savings [Dornbusch and Reynoso, 1993].  Various econo-
metric testing from Asia, Latin America, and Africa also confirms the lack of corre-
spondence between interest and savings, even among strong proponents of orthodoxy
like Fry [1988] as well as many others (for example, Giovannini [1985], Gupta [1987],
Cho and Khatkhate [1989b],  Gonzalez Arrieta [1988], De Melo and Tybout [1986],
Warman and Thirlwall [1994], Oshikoya [1992], Taiwo [1992], and Reichel [1991]). The
overwhelming evidence has even encouraged McKinnon [1993] to abandon the higher-
interest-to-prior-savings argument in favor of a rise in the “quality” of investment after
liberalization.
Worse for the financial liberalization thesis, there are studies that have actually
shown a negative relationship between interest rates and savings. Matsheka [1998]
tests the relationship between the variables for the period 1976 to 1995 in the case of
Botswana. A negative and significant relationship between real deposit interest rates
and the log of real domestic savings is found to prevail. The same study also examines
the effect of deposit rates on private saving levels (since savings are overwhelmingly
dominated by the government in the mineral economy of Botswana) and still finds it
negative and significant. Matsheka [1998] takes it one step further and disaggregates
the impact of real interest rates into the nominal portion and the inflation component.
The financial liberalization school predicts that the nominal interest rate will have a
positive impact on private savings and the inflation rate a negative impact. Contrary
to their prediction, the results are the opposite. The nominal rate is negative and
significant and the inflation rate positive and significant. This is consistent with a
Keynesian-type precautionary motive of savings rather than a monetarist-type portfo-
lio shift from savings to assets that are inflation hedges.
Studies utilizing data on real interest rates and financial savings have produced
more mixed results, even though they are consistent with both Keynesian and finan-
cial liberalization theory. Warman and Thirlwall [1994] show a strong correlation be-
tween real interest rates and M4, net of demand deposits in the Mexican context. Seck
and Yasim [1993] indicate a correlation between M2/GDP and real deposit interest
rates for a pooled sample of 21 countries within Africa (and also for a subgroup of nine
of the countries that includes Botswana). This is using a simple regression with an
absurdly low adjusted R2 (.084), however. Moreover, Matsheka [1998] is unable to
confirm these results for Botswana. The real deposit rate is negative and insignificant.
Further, literature testing the relationship between real interest rates and invest-
ment seldom confirms the relationship predicted by McKinnon and Shaw. Warman
and Thirlwall [1994] use Mexican data and find an overall negative relationship. In a
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between real deposit rates and investment rates in a simple regression with ridicu-
lously low adjusted R2 (0.039). Once the effect is broken down into nominal interest
rates and inflation and other variables are introduced, however, the relationship no
longer holds. Nominal interest rates have a negative and significant relationship with
investment. In the case of Botswana, Matsheka [1998] shows a negative but insignifi-
cant relationship between real deposit rates and the log of gross domestic investment.
By contrast, the availability of credit and a lagged accelerator relationship are positive
and significant. As the author points out, credit has actually become less available to
the private sector in the wake of financial liberalization, a phenomenon also seen in
Nigeria and in Jamaica. In the case of Jamaica, for example, real lending to manufac-
turing plummeted 83 percent between 1989, when financial liberalization began, and
1999 [Stein, Cuesta, and McLennon 2002]. Similarly, in Nigeria, there was a negative
and very significant relationship between the number of banks and real lending to the
private sector and the number of banks and the level of financial savings relative to
GDP. Financial disintermediation and a vicious circle arose from liberalization, not
the virtuous circle predicted by McKinnon-Shaw [Lewis and Stein, 2002].
Other surveys have indicated negative consequences of financial liberalization.
Ndung’u [1997] surveys nine English-speaking African countries introducing orthodox
financial liberalization and finds declining investment; few examples of a rise in sav-
ings; reduced efficiency of intermediation, as measured by the rising spread between
deposit and lending rates; and falling GDP growth rates. Other authors have docu-
mented rising interest rate spreads in places like Venezuela [Vera, 2002] and a mix of
African countries [Nissanke, 2002]. For Jamaica, Stein, Cuesta, and McLennon [2002]
test the relationship between the growth of financial institutions and the spread between
deposit and lending rates, and establish a positive and significant relationship between
the number of financial institutions and the spread, completely contrary to the predic-
tion of McKinnon-Shaw. The chaos caused by financial liberalization was leading to
growing inefficiency of intermediation.
It follows from the above analysis and empirical results that it is paramount to
develop alternatives to the McKinnon-Shaw thesis, given its weak theoretical base
and poor empirical performance. For this, we propose to adopt an institutional-centric
view of finance and development as a way towards alternative financial policy formulation.
FINANCIAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
Our analysis so far clearly indicates that the focus on price formation largely
renders financial liberalization theory a-institutional; it also lends itself to misunder-
standing how institutions in developing countries work, when scant attention is paid
to them. Yet, the critical importance of “institutional endowments” for economic growth
has increasingly been emphasized by many recent econometric studies—see, for example,
Rodrik [1999] and Acemoglu et al. [2002] for the institutions-growth-macroeconomic
performances, and Chinn and Ito [2002] for the institutions-financial development
link. Even authors largely in favor of the goal of monetary restraint have recognized
the importance of designing new policies in the context of the “institutional endowments”
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independent central banks, depends on the country’s other formal arrangements, such
as fiscal policy, and many informal institutional arrangements, like domestic interest
group organizations; international relations; and the history, norms, and ideology of a
country. What is useful from Ball’s [1999] analysis is the recognition that financial
transformation is fundamentally an institutional phenomenon, which interacts with
the existing institutional endowment. What is less useful is the dichotomous distinc-
tion between formal and informal institutions. The formal-informal distinction arises
from the work of North [1990] and is aimed at explaining the hidden constraints on
formal levels of transformation. In the case of Ball [1999] these hidden constraints
affect the extent of the rigidity needed in new monetary institutions in creating rules
for monetary constraint. The greater is the informal commitment to monetary con-
straint, the greater is the flexibility in using monetary policy in reacting to unfore-
seen shocks.
There are problems with Ball’s [1999] framework. First, the distinction between
formal and informal is rather arbitrary. As Sindzingre and Stein [2002] note, differ-
ences between the formal and informal constitute a continuum of activities rather
than a duality of polar opposites. Second, the formal/informal distinction is used in the
sense of maximizing an objective function subject to constraints. The relationship is
unidirectional in the sense that the informal acts to limit the formal in reaching the
goal or objective function. In fact, the aim of transformation is not one of designing
formal rules to be consistent with informal institutional constraints, but to transform
the existing institutional endowment for specific purposes. This is complicated in the
framework due to a third problem, namely the conflating of dimensions of institutions
with the framework of institutions themselves. Norms in the Veblenian sense of “hab-
its of thought common to the generality of men and women” can be institutions them-
selves. Thus, ideology and history play a central role in creating the framework of
institutional transformation, while organizations, or even interest groups, are an impor-
tant dimension of institutions in the sense of concatenating people in a structure with
common rules and purposes. Lumping all these together as informal institutions is
rather conceptually problematic.
A great deal of backing of the importance of institutions emanates from the imper-
fect information school (for example, Stiglitz, [1985, 1994]). Imperfect information in
the financial markets dictates the existence of information-gathering institutions. Institu-
tions matter, therefore, especially those of the financial intermediation variety. Under
such circumstances, the structure of finance, debt versus equity, becomes of para-
mount importance. Three schools of thought can be identified on this score: the bank-
based view, which emphasizes the positive role of banks in development and growth
[Gerschenkron, 1962; Stiglitz, 1985; Singh, 1997]; the market-based view, which high-
lights the advantages of well-functioning markets [Beck and Levine, 2002]; and the
financial services view, according to which neither banks nor markets matter—it is
financial services themselves that are by far more important than the form of their
delivery. They are different components of the financial system; they do not compete,
and as such ameliorate different costs, transaction and information, in the system
[Boyd and Smith, 1998]. These views are concerned with building institutions that
support the development of markets. The workings of these institutions become the
focus of the analysis, especially the regulatory aspects of the institutional framework.6257 ALTERNATIVES TO FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION THEORY
While information gathering is an important aspect of institutional design, it is
only one dimension of financial institutions. We propose going beyond the ideas that
underlie those of the imperfect information school, and also beyond the misleading
distinction between formal and informal institutions, to an institutional-centric theory
of the transformation of a developmentally oriented financial system. It is important
to distinguish institutional forces from institutional purposes and institutional out-
comes in terms of the genesis, evolution, and maturation of institutions. For concep-
tual clarity, there needs to be a careful understanding of the relationship between
institutional contexts and potential institutional transformation paths. Financial sys-
tems can be disaggregated into five institutionally related components that are inter-
active in producing particular outcomes. Each operates in a particular institutional
context. The five components are norms, incentives, regulations, capacities, and organizations.7
In the context of financial systems, norms are habits of thought that arise from
social esteem and sanctions derived from established patterns of banking. They involve
rules of thumb, the development of trust and professional habits that encourage pro-
bity, and the proper conduct that is the backbone of banking. While these are central
to the development and operation of any banking system, banking for development
must also incorporate norms that encourage the extension of time horizons as an
integral part of intermediation.
Incentives focus on the rewards and penalties that arise from different modes of
behavior. The institutional-centric view of incentives is dissimilar to marginal calcu-
lating utility maximizers embedded in neoclassical economics. First, incentives are
not simply delivered via markets but can arise within a variety of different organiza-
tional constructs. Second, humans are foremost social beings who are motivated by
rewards and penalties that go well beyond income or material factors. In the context
of banking, financial variables like interest rates are only one dimension of a variety
of factors that shape banking decisions and behavior. Promotions, the loss of social
esteem, threats of ostracism, social responsibility, legal repercussions, professional-
ism, and pride, etc., are all central to generating the incentives for expanding and
operating banking systems in developing countries.
Regulations constitute the legal boundaries that help set the rules of operation in
financial systems. The regulatory dimensions are well known and include prudential
guidelines on the provisions for and categorization of asset risk; accounting standards;
auditing schedules; deposit insurance stipulations; capital requirements; licensing rules
and procedures; regulation on interest rate determination and interbank markets;
scope of operations in terms of the types of financial devices sold; and property right
issues, including rules to access collateral when loan payments are in default, etc.
What is particularly important is a careful specification of the spheres of interaction
among the components of the economy, including ownership among the different seg-
ments of the financial system and their linkage to industrial, agricultural, and other
service sectors. One of the reasons why empirical testing between finance and growth
is so indeterminate is precisely because cases of successful banking in developing
countries have arisen when there is a dynamic interface among investment, produc-
tion, and banking.
The issue of legally setting out incentives to loan, monitor, and supervise activi-
ties that have higher risk but are more developmental becomes an important part of258 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the juridical design of financial systems. An equally important issue is the mecha-
nisms to institutionalize the legal system in the sense of encouraging the internaliza-
tion of the rules of operation. Rewards and punitive measures may be necessary to
enforce regulations in the initial phases. The ultimate aim of the design of any regu-
latory system is to have monitoring become the prime function and have intervening
enforcement become the exception, not the rule.
Capacities are related to the underlying capabilities of the constitutive members
(individuals and other subunits) of organizations to operate in an effective manner to
achieve the goals of an organization within the confines of its norms and rules. These
capabilities must be developed in a consonant manner on both the regulatory and
banking sides. One of the great tragedies of liberalization has been the asymmetric
expansion of banking entities compared to the auditing and other regulatory capaci-
ties of supervising agencies. While new legal organizations expanded in places like
Nigeria, the capabilities of the individuals within these new structures were extremely
weak, providing the opportunity for misuse relative to their stated purpose.
Organizations are legally recognized structures that combine groups of people
with defined common rules and purposes. They include both state regulatory agencies
and financial intermediaries. As intermediaries, countries should focus on creating an
assortment of ownership and banking types to deal with the multitiered financial
needs of a developing economy (merchant, development, commercial, microfinance,
local, state, international, and cooperative ownership, etc.).  In all these structures
the state will need to assume risk both on the deposit side and loan side (given that
the most developmental project will often have the higher risks). Without the social-
ization of private risk, it is difficult to see how private investment and accumulation
will occur in developing countries. There are many options for ensuring that the
criteria for subsidization or access to funds are being met and are consistent with
developmental needs (Korean-style policy loans, Japanese main bank system, busi-
ness-government councils, planning agencies, partial state ownership of banks, devel-
opmental banks, etc.). To avoid instability, capital accounts need to be carefully con-
trolled, including the access of banking systems to international loans.
Unfortunately, little of this is currently happening. In the wake of the widespread
failure of financial liberalization (including privatization to domestic owners) in the
1990s, developing and transitional economies have been turning increasingly to sell-
ing off financial institutions to foreign banks using a single type of organizational
construct, the commercial bank. The move has been particularly strong in transi-
tional economies like Hungary and the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic has paid
an estimated 21 percent of the GDP to clean up the financial system after an exercise
in orthodox liberalization. In response, 95 percent of the banking sector has been sold
off. The focus of these banks is on servicing richer clients and multinational investors.
Few funds are being made available to domestic investors. Small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) employ nearly 60 percent of the country’s workforce and generate about
40 percent of the GDP. However, it is estimated that only 2 percent of SMEs were able
to obtain a loan in 2000. Many are holding their assets in government paper or loans
to the interbank market (Financial Times, 2001; November 21, 2002). For some coun-
tries, like Tanzania, they have simply moved from state ownership to foreign owner-
ship. While this has avoided the enormously costly exercise in financial liberalization259 ALTERNATIVES TO FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION THEORY
experienced by their neighbors in East Africa, the new foreign banks are holding
massive excess reserves in the form of government paper with only few loans in the
hands of a handful of wealthy customers. Moreover, instead of accessing global finance,
foreign banks in many countries are exporting national savings to safer havens.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have argued in this paper that the financial liberalization thesis is weak on
both theoretical and empirical grounds. An alternative is desperately needed. We
have sketched the essentials of such an alternative, but more research is clearly
required. At the core of the project is the institutionalization of finance. For new
financial systems to be institutionalized, they must become legitimate entities in the
sense that they are embedded in the circuits of social and economic production. Ulti-
mately, for banking norms to be developmental, they need to be absorbed into the
consciousness of the general population, which is more likely to happen when struc-
tures are diverse, participatory, and accessible. A belief that financial systems in develop-
ing countries can be built by adjusting price signals and retracting state intervention
will continue to lead to the chaos we have witnessed in many places for far too many
years.
NOTES
1. In neoclassical terms, the first-order condition for intertemporal utility maximization from con-
sumption is such that the ratio between marginal utilities in any two periods must be equal to the
expected discount rate. In this model, it is assumed that financial liberalization not only raises real
interest rates, but also allows individuals new access to borrowing to smooth consumption over
time within a life cycle framework. In the credit-constrained world, the marginal utility of present
consumption exceeds the marginal utility of future consumption. The new access to credit increases
consumption initially since the consumption of the young rises. The fall in savings that results is
short lived as individuals adjust their consumption over time (consumption will fall as they get
older). What is most important is an increase in sensitivity to variables like interest rates. A rise in
the interest rate decreases the incentive to borrow and lowers the utility of consumption, raising
the inducement to save and lowering the excess demand for savings. See, for example, Gersovitz
[1988], Bayoumi [1993], and Mavrotas and Kelly [2001].
2. McKinnon [1973] uses a Fisher/Hirshleifer (see, for example, Hirshleifer [1970]) approach to
capital theory, in which the utility of an entrepreneur in intertemporal decision making is related
to three issues: his endowment or potential self-deployed capital, his investment opportunities,
and his market opportunities for external lending or borrowing. In a fragmented market typical of
developing countries, the three components of decision making are badly correlated. For example,
those with internal funds might have few profitable opportunities. The way forward is through the
reduction of the dispersion of rates of return to a “single allocative mechanism” that can “accu-
rately reflect the prevailing scarcity of capital” [McKinnon, 1973, 11-12]. By drawing on Hirshleifer’s
[1970] view of capital, McKinnon [1973] is taking a rather extreme position, in which the interest
rate is not only equal to the return to capital—the opportunity cost of using internal funds—but it
also reflects the rate of intertemporal preference (for example, the rate of discounting the future).
3. The financial liberalization school has heavily influenced World Bank thinking throughout the
1980s and 1990s. This is evident throughout their own publications: see, for example, World Bank
[1983, 58-59; 1989, 171; 1994, 114-115].
4. For most recent cross-country exercises for this purpose, see Reinhart and Tokatlidis [2002],
Galindo, Micco, and Ordonez [2002], and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundbrad [2002].
5. Habibullah’s [1999] statistical work uses Granger causality tests and quarterly data spanning the
period 1981-94 for seven Asian countries. This period was one that exhibited a good deal of260 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
financial liberalization in these countries, including interest rate liberalization and a variety of new
financial instruments. In five of the seven cases the causal relationship was from growth to
finance or bi-directionality.
6. This definition of institutions as “rules, enforcement mechanisms, and organizations…that sup-
port market transactions” [World Bank, 2002, 6] draws on two contributions. The first is North
[1990], in which, as mentioned above, there is the formal/informal aspect, complemented by
“humanly devised constraints,” such as “codes of conduct,” “formal rules,” and “laws,” that are
aimed “to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange” [North, 1991, 97]. The second is the
work of Nabli and Nugent [1989], who are concerned with how institutions change with respect to
their organizational nature. Their focus is on the extent to which institutions and organizations
coincide. Our approach, by contrast, looks at five institutionally related but conceptually distinct
components that interact to produce valid outcome.
7. See Nissanke and Stein [2003] for a more detailed breakdown of these components.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., and Thaicharoen, Y. Institutional Causes, Macroeco-
nomic Systems: Volatility, Crises and Growth. NBER Working Paper 9124. September 2002.
The African. June 2002.
Akinboade, O. A. Financial Development and Economic Growth in Botswana: A Test of Causality.
Savings and Development 22 (3) 1998, 331-48.
Arestis, P. and Demetriades, P. Financial Development and Economic Growth: Assessing the Evi-
dence. Economic Journal, May 1997, 783-99.
Arestis, P., Demetriades, P., and Fattouh, B. Financial Policies and the Aggregate Productivity of
the Capital Stock: Evidence from Developed and Developing Countries.” Eastern Economic
Journal, Spring 2003, 219-44.
Arestis, P. and Glickman, M. Financial Crisis in South East Asia: Dispelling Illusion the Minskyan
Way. Cambridge Journal of Economics, March 2002, 237-60.
Armijo, L. Mixed Blessing: Expectations about Foreign Capital Flows and Democracy in Emerging
Markets. In Financial Globalization and Democracy in Emerging Markets, edited by L. Armijo.
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
Bagehot, W. Lombard Street. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1873.
Ball, R. The Institutional Foundations of Monetary Commitment: A Comparative Analysis. World
Development, October 1999, 1821-42.
Bayoumi, T. Financial Saving and Household Saving. Economic Journal, November 1993, 1432-43.
Beck, T. and Levine, R. Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-
Based System Matter? NBER Working Paper No. 8982, 2002.
Bekaert G., Harvey, C. R., and Lundbrad, C. Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth? Paper
presented at World Bank Conference on Financial Globalization, May 2002.
Boyd, J. H., and Smith, B. D. The Evolution of Debt and Equity Markets in Economic Development.
Economic Theory, November 1998, 519-60.
Calvo, G. Servicing the Public Debt: the Role of Expectations. American Economic Review, September
1988, 647-61.
Caprio, G. Jr., Atiyas, I., and Hanson, J. A. (eds.) Financial Reform: Theory and Experience,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Chinn D. M. and Ito, H. Capital Account Liberalization, Institutions and Financial Development:
Cross Country Evidence.” Department of Economics, University of California–Santa Cruz,
2002.
Cho, Y-J. and Khatkhate, D. Lessons of Financial Liberalisation in Asia: A Comparative Study.
World Bank Discussion Papers, 50, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989a.
____________. Financial Liberalization: Issues and Evidence. Economic and Political Weekly, 20 May
1989b.
De Melo, J. and Tybout, J. The Effects of Financial Liberalization on Savings and Investment in
Uruguay. Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 1986, 561-87.
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and
Developed Countries. IMF Staff Papers, 45, 1998, 81-109.261 ALTERNATIVES TO FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION THEORY
____________. Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility. In Proceedings of the 1998 World Bank
Conference on Development Economics, edited by B. Pleskovic and J. E. Stiglitz. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 1999.
Dornbusch, R. and Reynoso, A. Financial Factors in Economic Development. In Policy Making in
the Open Economy: Concepts and Case Studies in Economic Performance, edited by R. Dornbusch.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Financial Times. 12 March 1999,
____________. 12 December 2001.
____________. 21 November 2002.
Fry, M. Money, Interest and Banking in Economic Development, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1988.
Galindo A., Micco, A., and Ordonez, G. Financial Liberalization and Growth: Empirical Evidence.
Paper presented at World Bank Conference on Financial Globalization, May 2002.
Gerschenkron, A. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. A Book of Essays, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Gersovitz, M. Savings and Development. In Handbook of Development Economics, edited by H.
Chenery and S. Srinivasan. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988.
Giovannini, A. Savings and Real Interest Rates in LDCs. Journal of Development Economics, 18 (2-3)
1985, 197-217.
Gonzalez Arrieta, G. M. Interest Rates, Savings and Growth in LDCs: An Assessment of Recent
Empirical Research. World Development, May 1988, 589-605.
Grabel, I. Speculation-Led Economic Development: A Post-Keynesian Interpretation of Financial
Liberalization Programs. International Review of Applied Economics, 9 (2) 1995, 127-49.
Gupta, K. L. Aggregate Savings, Financial Intermediation and Interest Rates. Review of Economics
and Statistics, May 1987, 303-11.
Habibullah, M. S. Financial Development and Economic Growth in Asian Countries: Testing the
Financial-Led Growth Hypothesis. Savings and Development, 23 (3) 1999, 279-90.
Hellman, T. F., Murdock, K. C., and Stiglitz, J. E. Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and
Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough? American Economic Review, March
2000, 147-165.
Hirshleifer, J. Investment, Interest and Capital. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New York: Harvest/Harcourt
Brace Johanovich, 1936.
Lewis, P. and Stein, H. The Political Economy of Financial Liberalization in Nigeria. In Deregulation
and the Banking Crisis in Nigeria: A Comparative Study, edited by H. Stein, O. Ajakaiye, and
P. Lewis, 21-52. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.
Lindgreen, C-J., Garcia, G., and Saal, I. S. Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy. Washing-
ton, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996.
Matsheka, T. C. Interest Rates and the Saving-Investment Process in Botswana. African Review of
Money, Finance and Banking, (1-2) 1998, 5-23.
Mavrotas, G. and Kelly, R. Savings Mobilization and Financial Sector Development: The Nexus.
Savings and Development, 25 (1) 2001, 33-64.
McKinnon, R. Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institu-
tion, 1973.
____________. Financial Liberalisation in Retrospect: Interest Rate Policies in LDCs. In The State of
Development Economics, edited by G. Ranis and T. P. Schultz. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
____________. The Order of Financial Liberalization. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1993.
Minsky, H. P. Can “It” Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
1984.
Nabli, M. K. and Nugent, J. B., eds. The New Institutional Economics and Development Theory and
Applications to Tunisia. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1989.
Ndung’u, N. The Impact of Financial Sector Liberalization on Savings, Investment, Growth, and
Financial Development in Anglophone Africa. African Development Review, June 1997, 20-51.
Nissanke, M. African Experience with Financial Sector Reforms: What Has Been Achieved So Far? In
Deregulation and the Banking Crisis in Nigeria: A Comparative Study, edited by H. Stein, O.
Ajakaiye, and P. Lewis, 129-67. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.262 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Nissanke, M. and Stein, H. Financial Globalization and Economic Development: Toward an Institu-
tional Foundation. Eastern Economic Journal, Spring 2003, 287-308.
North, D. C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
____________. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1991, 97-112.
Oshikoya, T. W. Interest Rate Liberalization, Savings, Investment, and Growth: The Case of Kenya.
Savings and Development 16, 1992, 305-21.
Patrick, H. Financial Development and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Economic Devel-
opment and Cultural Change, 14 (2) 1966, 174-89.
Polanyi, K. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic origins of Our Time. Boston:
Beacon Press, Inc., 1957.
Reichel, R. The Macroeconomic Impact of Negative Real Interest Rates in Nigeria: Some Econometric
Evidence. Savings and Development 15, 1991, 273-83.
Reinhart, C. M. and Tokatlidis, L. Before and After Financial Liberalization. Paper presented at
World Bank Conference on Financial Globalization, May 2002.
Robinson, J. The Generalization of the General Theory. In The Rate of Interest and Other Essays,
edited by J. Robinson. London: MacMillan, 1952.
Rodrik, D. Trade and Capital Account Liberalisation in a Keynesian Economy. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, August 1987, 113-29.
____________. Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them. Paper
presented at the IMF Conference on Second-Generation Reform, 8-9 November 1999.
Sachs, J. Conditionality, Debt Relief and the Developing Countries’ Debt Crisis. In Developing Coun-
try Debt and Economic Performance, edited by J. Sachs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988.
Sahoo, P., Geethanjali, N., and Kamaiah, B. Savings and Economic Growth in India: The Long-
Run Nexus. Savings and Development 25 (1) 2001, 66-80.
Schumpeter, J. A. The Theory of Economic Development. Leipzig: Dunker and Humblot, 1912.
Seck, D. and Yasim, H. E. N. Financial Liberalization in Africa. World Development. November 1993,
1867-90.
Shaw, E. Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Sindzingre, A. and Stein, H. Institutions, Development, and Global Integration: A Theoretical Con-
tribution. CNRS, July 2002.
Singh, A. Financial Liberalisation, Stock Markets and Economic Development. Economic Journal,
May 1997, 771-82.
Stein, H., Ajakaiye, O., and Lewis, P., eds. Deregulation and the Banking Crisis in Nigeria: A
Comparative Study. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.
Stein, H., Cuesta, M. and McLennon, R. Financial Liberalization and the Jamaican Financial Debacle.
Department of Economics, Roosevelt University, 2002.
Stiglitz, J. E. Credit Markets and the Control of Capital. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, May
1985, 133-52.
____________. Financial Markets and Development. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Winter 1989,
55-68.
____________. The Role of the State in Financial Markets. In World Bank Proceedings of the World
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1993. Washington, D.C.: World Bank,
1994.
Taiwo, I. O. A Flow-of-Funds Approach to Savings Mobilization Using Nigerian Data. Savings and
Development, 16 (2) 1992, 168-82.
Underhill, G., ed. The New World Order in International Finance, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.
Vera, L. A Chronicle of a Latin American Country Financial Crash: The Case of Venezuela. In Deregu-
lation and the Banking Crisis in Nigeria: A Comparative Study, edited by H. Stein, O. Ajakaiye,
and P. Lewis, 168-92. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.
Villanueva, D. and Mirakhor, A. Interest Rate Policies, Stabilisation and Bank Supervision in
Developing Countries: Strategies for Financial Reform. International Monetary Fund Working
Papers, WP/90/8. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1990.
Warman, F. and Thirlwall, A. P. Interest Rates, Savings, Investment and Growth in Mexico 1960-90:
Test of the Financial Liberalization Hypothesis. Journal of Development Studies, April 1994, 629-649.263 ALTERNATIVES TO FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION THEORY
Weller, C. Financial Crises and Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Circumstances or Structural
Weaknesses? Journal of Development Studies, October 2001, 98-126.
World Bank. World Development Report, 1983. Washington D.C., 1983.
____________. Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective
Study. Washington D.C., 1989.
____________. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Washington, D.C., 1993.
____________. Adjustment in Africa, Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead. Washington D.C., 1994.
____________. Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World. A World Bank Policy Research
Report. Washington D.C., 2001.
____________. World Development Report, 2002, Building Institutions for Markets. Washington, D.C.,
2002.